Exploring the impact of foreign aid on governance in Ghana by Lawson, Naa Lamiley
Running head: THE IMPACT OF AID ON GOVERNANCE 
















Undergraduate Thesis submitted to the Department of Business Administration, 
Ashesi University, in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of Bachelor 








Naa Lamiley Lawson 
May 2020 
 
THE IMPACT OF AID ON GOVERNANCE i 
DECLARATION 
I hereby declare that this thesis is my original work and that no part of it has been 
presented for another degree in this university or elsewhere. 
Candidate’s Signature: 
Candidate’s Name: Naa Lamiley Lawson 






I hereby declare that the preparation and presentation of the thesis were supervised in 
accordance with the guidelines on supervision of thesis laid down by Ashesi University.  
Supervisor’s Signature: 
Supervisor’s Name: Dr. Edgar Cooke 









THE IMPACT OF AID ON GOVERNANCE ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
My utmost gratitude goes to the Almighty God for granting me the knowledge, strength, 
and endurance needed to successfully complete this thesis. 
 
Special thanks goes to my supervisor, Dr Cooke, whose guidance and thorough 
feedback enriched the quality of this project. I am grateful for his support, especially 
during these unsettling times, his invaluable knowledge and time spent supervising my 
thesis. Without his input, this project could not have been a success. 
 
My final appreciation goes to my friends and family whose support and love served as 















THE IMPACT OF AID ON GOVERNANCE iii 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a contribution to the body of knowledge on aid and governance. African 
countries depend on official development assistance to conduct primary governmental 
functions. However, few countries are well governed or show signs of aid efficacy. 
Also, various accounts of the impact of aid on development are divergent in their 
conclusions but regardless of this, there is an influx of aid to solve Africa’s problems. 
On the other hand, the crucial role of governance quality in establishing development 
is rather apparent. With the continuous flow of aid in the face of deteriorate governance, 
there is the apparent question: Is aid dependency deteriorating governance? Mainstream 
theory suggest that the two variables are related.  Therefore, this thesis sought to explore 
if indeed the relationship between foreign aid and governance holds for Ghana, the 
flagship country for IFI programs and a country known for its stable governance. With 
the use of OLS regression on time series data (1984 – 2018), it was found that aid rather 
promotes governance in Ghana. Governance is measured using the International 
Country Risk Guide Quality of Governance index and aid dependence is measured by 
aid percentage of GDP. This finding should be used to spearhead further research into 
deriving lessons for Africa from the mechanisms that contribute to the aid-governance 
efficacy in Ghana. Also, since Ghana, through the Ghana Beyond Aid agenda is bent 
on reducing foreign aid, it is important to consider the performance capacity of both 
Ghana and Africa with less foreign aid.  
 
Keywords: Official Development Aid, foreign aid, governance, good governance, time 
series data, OLS regression.  
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DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Official Development Aid: Official Development Aid or Foreign Aid is assistance 
provided either bilaterally, from donor to the recipient or multilaterally through a 
development agency for developmental purposes (OECD, 2016). The scope of this 
assistance includes cash, expert advice, loans at concessional rates as well as technical 
assistance (Riddell, 2008). 
 
Governance: Governance is a nexus that relies on the interaction between a number of 
concepts and economic policies by which the public participates in project planning 
according to the UNDP (As cited by Jaouadi & Hermass, 2012). 
 
Good Governance: According to the World Bank, this is “the management of public 
resources, accounting, legal framework, free information and transparency” (as cited in 
Jaouadi et al., 2012, p. 186). Good governance can be perceived in the form of 
institutions that demonstrate predictable, unbiased, and consistently enforced 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
 The former United States President Harry Truman made the first mention of the 
notion of foreign aid in development policies. This proposal addressed the urgency for 
some manner of development assistance to underdeveloped areas as a result of the 
Second World War. This spoke to the inequalities and severe poverty that had gripped 
countries at that time. It also showed a resolve on the part of wealthier and developed 
countries to foster development and alleviate the suffering of the impoverished. 
Consequently, the preponderant goal of disbursing foreign aid is to “help people help 
themselves, i.e. help to self-help” (Abeselom, 2018). Foreign aid is described by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2016) as assistance 
provided either bilaterally, from donor to the recipient or multilaterally through a 
development agency for developmental purposes. The scope of this assistance includes 
cash, expert advice, loans at concessional rates as well as technical assistance (Riddell, 
2008).  
This call for aid was first steered towards the reconstruction of Europe due to 
the turmoil caused by the war. The United States initiated the European Recovery Plan 
or Marshall Plan, a 4-year development agenda, to bring reformation to Europe after 
the Second World War. For this purpose, some USD13 billion in aid flows went to 
western Europe (Riddell, 2008). This goal of rebuilding slowly led into another goal of 
combating the furtherance of communism in Europe. This eventually resulted in the 
Cold War era where the role of foreign aid became a means to secure allies in both 
Latin America and Africa in relation to loyalty to either the United States or the Soviet 
Union (Riddell, 2008). On the African continent, Mozambique and Angola aligned and 
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received aid from the Soviet Union while Democratic Republic of Congo received aid 
and aligned with the United States (Sousa, 2016).  
 Foreign aid, as it is organized today, began during the 1960s through 
institutionalization. Here, the engagement of foreign governmental agencies from 29 
members of the Development Assistance Committee, more than 29 other donor 
countries, non-governmental organizations and multilateral agencies evolved to form 
an interconnected network (Gulrajani, 2016; Schaaf, 2013). This structured process was 
geared towards Official Development Aid (ODA) outlays to third world countries. 
Initially, this new focus on developing countries employed a development approach 
which was and still is skewed towards the modernity theory.  The modernity theory 
favors a linear path towards development to look like that of the West. This is often 
characterized by implementing limiting the role of government and free market 
policies. However, with the argument becoming more nuanced with time, human 
development and shared responsibility approaches to development undertaken by 
multilateral donors such as the United Nations (UN) are increasingly the selected option 
in making development pro-poor (Hulme, 2016). These undertakings include the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs). 
 The change in the ODA structure during the Cold War towards the current 
institutionalization should make aid more effective; however, this has not been the case 
(Sunberg & Gelb, 2006). One of the reasons that some scholars are reproving the 
effectiveness of aid is that most of African countries have high corruption rate and 
authoritarian governments. (Farah, Önder & Ayhan, 2018). According to LaFraniere 
(2005), most of the ODA flows have been depleted through fraud, waste and 
malfeasance. This can be attributed to the lack of quality institutions. In Nigeria, audits 
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disclosed many uncompleted projects financed with funds in hundreds of millions in 
international loans (LaFraniere, 2005). In the late 1990’s to the early 2000’s, large 
amounts of ODA flows were administered to countries that became politically unstable; 
A fourth of all ODA flows to Africa from 1980 – 2000 were allocated to countries 
experiencing political instability (Sunberg & Gelb, 2006). However, newer trends show 
that aid is being allocated to states with better civil liberties and political rights (Sunberg 
et al, 2006). This indicates that policy selectivity in aid allocation has risen. On the other 
hand, ODA is also believed to foster growth in countries with political stability 
(Dalgaard, Hansen, & Tarp, 2004; Armah, 2010). This likely link between aid and 
governance is made apparent from trend development over the years. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 Though the logical aim of ODA is to foster economic growth and reduce 
extreme poverty, ODA flows to recipient countries are often associated with its failure 
to deliver development to third world countries and this is for a good reason. Africa, to 
a large extent, has been a recipient of ODA since the 1960’s, with total ODA amounts 
to the continent exceeding USD568 billion between 1965 and 2007 (Easterly, 2007). 
Despite the fact that the effectiveness of aid is varied in accounts, there is still a reliance 
on aid inflow to solve global issues.  
Regarding the impact of aid through human development and shared 
responsibility approaches, Sachs holds the view that the MDGs could have been 
achieved by 2015 if only there was an increase in aid flows from donor countries (as 
cited in Riddell, 2008). However, Easterly disagrees, stating that though USD 2.3 
trillion in foreign aid has been disbursed in the past 50 years, there are still cases of 
malaria deaths that could be prevented by 12 cent medications (as cited in Riddell, 
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2008). In relation to the SDGs, 4 years after its implementation, the UN Statistical 
Statistics Division for the SDGs Reports in 2018 shared that the progress on the goals 
is not fast enough to achieve the set target by the year 2030. To remedy this, donor 
countries must increase their aid as a percentage of gross national income to the 
criterion of 0.7% set by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
and target half of their aid to poverty-stricken countries (Udsholt, 2018, Yanguas, 
2018). The publication also mentions that a gap of USD 2.7 trillion needs to be filled 
to accomplish SDG 1 by 2030; this can only be realized through deploying private 
funds.   
 The limits of the aid programmes intended for development may be ascribed to 
governmental structures in recipient countries. Moss, Pettersson, Gelander & Van de 
Walle (2006) argue that aid only works when recipient countries employ good 
governance. Here, there is a need for well-functioning institutions as a prerequisite for 
aid effectiveness due to their higher absorption capacities. However, this may be 
counterproductive to the need for large amounts of aid for building sound institutions 
(Moss et al., 2006). Therefore, there is a paradoxical relationship that shows that 
although strong management and administrative systems are needed to ensure effective 
use of aid, there is the need for aid to enhance governance systems. This is shown on 
the one hand, when aid frees up revenue constraints which allows governments to build 
their institutions and provides technical assistance and training to strengthen their legal 
and accounting systems.  Seasoned personnel (in some cases expatriates) manage 
significant aid programs, and this addition of resources and technical expertise may 
improve the efficiency of governance (Brautigam & Knack, 2004). On the other hand, 
it is possible, even with these benefits, that prolonged periods of large aid receipts may 
cause more difficulty for good governance to develop. Issues of aid fungibility, 
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corruption and rent seeking crop up (Newby, 2010). However, Brautigam et al. (2004) 
believe that governance reforms occur, and they can take place in poor countries; aid 
can contribute. Again, even the paradoxical effect of aid on governance, scholars in this 
field, advocate for more aid; it just needs to be disbursed more selectively in ways that 
increase governance quality (Brautigam et al., 2004).   
 If aid can contribute to governance reforms, it is important to research into cases 
in which aid has had a positive effect on governance. Country-specific cases where aid 
increased governance quality can be used in further researches and case studies to 
investigate effective mechanisms in which aid can be disbursed to support a virtuous 
cycle of development.  International financial institutions (IFIs) have often cited Ghana 
as the flagship country of their aid programs (Thomson, 2010). Ghana is therefore a 
good country-specific case to investigate a positive impact of aid on governance. Lloyd, 
Morrissey and Osei (2001) as well as Newby (2010) mention that to enhance the 
understanding of ODA efficiency, it is relevant to conduct country-specific studies on 
the impact of aid on development. These studies also provide a better view and 
clarification on varying factors and contexts (Newby, 2010). Therefore, a deeper 
investigation into the relationship between foreign aid and governance in Ghana is 
crucial in further understanding the nature and impact of foreign aid on governance and 
establishing a basis for further research into aid mechanisms that improve governance.   
 
1.3 Aid Profile of Ghana 
After Ghana gained its independence in 1957, Ghana’s economic outlook 
seemed prosperous as it was one of the wealthier colonies. It had substantial mineral 
deposits, vast tropical forests that would serve as a source of timber, a fairly good 
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transport system and the prospect of generating hydroelectricity. Fast forward into the 
1980’s, and the economy had collapsed; food production was lagging behind population 
growth, a stable manufacturing sector was yet to materialize, education, health and 
transport systems were in shambles and timber and cocoa production outputs had fallen 
(Thomson, 2010). This turn of economic outlook brought about the structural 
adjustment program.  
 
1.3.1 Structural Adjustment of the 1980’s 
The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was introduced in 1983 by the PNDC 
government to salvage a deteriorating economy. At the time, Ghana, and Africa, were 
suffering from unequal exchange on the international market, and the effects of 
continuous budget deficits. As part of the programme, the IMF delivered approximately 
USD 6 billion in concessional loans in exchange for implementing new economic 
policies. This included increasing cocoa producer prices by 67%, eliminating price 
controls on other products such as maize and reducing the number of state-owned 
enterprises by privatizing 80 parastatals; 195 state-owned enterprises had been 
privatized by the end of 1995 (Odutayo, 2015; Thomson, 2010).  
The success of this programme was seen in the stabilization of the country’s 
economy, with GDP increasing from USD 4.06 billion in 1983 to USD 4.41 billion in 
1984, a year after implementing SAPs. GDP continued to rise and peaked in 1986 at 
USD 5.73 billion, three years after the implementation of the SAPs. Also, inflation rates 
fell drastically to an annual average of 13% from 73% and industrial capacity grew 
from 25% to 46% in the period of two decades (1970-1990). This boost led to an overall 
balance of payments position becoming significantly favorable (Odutayo, 2015).  The 
extent at which Ghana adopted the neoliberal policies introduced by the IMF and World 
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Bank made Ghana the flagship country for the SAPs. This raised global confidence in 
Ghana’s economy, leading to an increase in credit rating and FDI into mining and 
infrastructure. 
Despite some economic redemption made possible by the SAPs, employment fell 
from 337,000 jobs in 1980 to 215,000 jobs in 1989, showing employment rates falling 
by 36.2% over the period (Addo, Korboe, Williams, & Mensah, 2010). During this 
period of SAPs, the government cut out subsidies, and introduced education and health 
user fees. Consequently, the school enrolment and healthcare for poor urban and rural 
homes worsened (Thomson, 2010). Last but not least, the perquisites of an increase in 
real minimum wage by 75% could not be felt as the increase in food prices and welfare 
services ate into the gains (Odutayo, 2015). 
Notwithstanding, the SAPs had a notable impact on the political system. With a 
cutdown in public services, supporters of the PNDC were hit hard. 40% of personnel 
working with the state cocoa board were dismissed together with 3,600 other civil 
servants working in the public sector (Thomson, 2010). Industrial workers were worse 
off with the removal of trade barriers, and professional workers such as nurses and 
doctors were also affected by the downsizing of public services. With the introduction 
of user fees, many students could not afford access to higher education as well as 
healthcare, thereby excluding many from schooling. The PNDC, therefore, encountered 
substantial opposition from these disadvantaged groups. These groups were initially 
contained through harassment and suppression. The Programme of Action to Mitigate 
the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) was initiated too late to convince 
Ghanaians of the advantage of the SAPs. However, the push for political change 
continuously rose, leading to organized movements geared towards the multi-party 
democracy advocacy. In due course, the PNDC yielded and contested open elections. 
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The PNDC’s accurate calculation of winning through rural support in any poll, while 
simultaneously deactivating the rising pressure from urban opposition, paid off. Lt. 
Jerry Rawlings won the elections with 58% of the vote. With this refreshed 
constitutional stamp on the regime, Rawlings won approval from developed countries 
for returning Ghana to democracy.  
 
1.3.2 Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), Highly Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC). 
The 1990s were marked with continuous increasing debts, and the World Bank 
and the IMF worked in unison to write off highly indebted poor countries (IMF, n.d).  
The initiative for HIPC began to ensure that no less developed country faced intractable 
debts. Though the initiative was implemented in 1996, it was not until the 2005 
Gleneagles summit, with the conception of the MDRI, that some African countries were 
relieved from indebtedness (Thomson, 2010). Since the 2000s, Ghana has closely 
followed the international financial institution prescription, maintaining an 
internationally approved macro-economic ecosystem. Therefore, Ghana was one of the 
first countries in Africa to benefit from the MDRI. The country’s initial total debt relief 
amount was USD 4.2 billion, which represented almost three-fourths of Ghana’s total 
debt of USD 6 billion.  
From 2001 through to 2008, ODA flows to Ghana rose from USD 578 million 
to USD 1.4 billion, a percentage increase of 23% (United Nations, 2010). Even with 
the outlook of high dependence on aid, Ghana has been branded as one of the successful 
stories of aid effectiveness in Africa (LaFraniere, 2005). However, the Department for 
International Development (DFID) in 2014 reported that this progress has lagged. As 
at 2010, external aid accounted for 10% of the country’s GDP.  
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Stability in Ghana’s politics has been a constant feature since the millennium 
began. Following Rawlings’s retirement, all transitions of power have been peaceful 
and democratic in spite of extreme narrow margins of victory. John Kufuor, who 
obtained power at the beginning of the millennium, served for two terms. John Atta-
Mills and John Mahama have all democratically served as presidents of the country’s 
fourth republic. The fifth and current president of Ghana is Nana Akuffo Addo, who 
came into power in December 2016. 
 
1.3.3 Ghana Beyond Aid Agenda 
Ghana Beyond Aid Agenda is a vision of the current president of Ghana, which 
is directed at transforming Ghana from her present socio-economic status to a thriving 
and flourishing economy that has her destiny at the helm; in other words, it is the current 
national transformational agenda that focuses on the vision of a self-confident Ghana 
that is in control of her economic destiny and thrives without aid (Government of Ghana 
(GOG), 2018).  
For three years, 2016 to 2018, aid as a percentage of central government 
expenditure stands at an average of 5.7%. Aid in this context is a sum of grants and 
concessional loans. The average of the grant component alone stands at an average of 
3.2%. For the year 2018, the numbers were below the average, as aid was 3.1% and 
grant was 2% of government expenditure. ODA flows to Ghana has been falling. In 
2015, ODA flows totaled USD1.7 billion. However, in 2016, it fell to USD1.3 billion 
and further to USD1.2 billion in 2018 (OECD, 2018).  
 However, on the overall budget, if interest payments, statutory transfers and 
compensation payments (i.e. wages, salaries, allowances, and pensions) are eliminated, 
aid averages 38.3% of government expenditure over the 2016 - 2018 period.  On the 
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ministerial level, these percentages are even higher. Aid as a percentage of expenditure 
on goods and services and capital for the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Water and 
Sanitation, and Local Government are 102.8, 312.1 and 104.1% respectively. The 
Ministry of Health and Gender, Children and Social Protection currently has aid levels 
at 46.9 and 54.3 percent of expenditure on goods and services. 
These numbers at the ministerial level show that though the government pays 
salaries, the operation of the ministries with the purchase of goods and services as well 
as capital expenditure is mostly hinged on the generosity of donors. Therefore, the 
marginal aid from donors is influential in shaping agenda and precedence even with the 
government handling majority of the expenditure. 
With that said, the target of this agenda is to increase the government’s own 
contribution to the budget. Therefore, on the overall budget, the target is to reduce the 
grant component of central government expenditure on goods, services and capital from 
an average of 21% between 2016 to 2018, to a value below 5% and 2% by the end of 
2023 and 2028 respectively. Also, the target for every Ministry and Service is to reduce 
grants as a percentage of GOG expenditure on goods and services and on capital to less 
than 10 percent by 2023, and below 5 percent by 2028. Thirdly, aid conditions not 
aligned to the country’s agenda and priorities will not be accepted.  
 
1.4 Research Question and Objectives 
The overarching objective of this study is to investigate the effectiveness of aid 
on political development, particularly governance, in Ghana. This study tested the 
hypothesis that aid increases the governance quality of Ghana. This hypothesis was 
based on the parodox Newby (2010) presents which realizes the need for aid to promote 
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quality institutions while aid effectiveness is dependent on governance present in the 
recipient country.  
This leads to the following research question that will guide the rest of the study. 
• Does aid increase the quality of governance in Ghana? 
 
1.5 Methodology 
Secondary data were accessed from the World Bank’s Databank Indicators, 
International Country Risk Indicators, The Political Risk Services (PRS) Group and 
The Quality of Governance (QOG) Institute. It was assumed that Official Development 
Assistance would have a positive impact on democracy level as proposed by Newby. 
Time series data were used to test the hypotheses stated above with regression analysis. 
In order to evaluate how foreign aid influences the political development of Ghana, the 
influence of foreign aid on governance was assessed.  
 
1.6 Significance of the study  
The motivation for this paper was to assess the aid – development relationship 
through empirical data that would shed light, on the effect of aid on the political 
conditions in Ghana. Scholars such as Easterly (2007) and Moyo (2009) are pessimistic 
about the effect of aid in Africa. This is highly contrasted with scholars such as Sachs 
(2005) and Collier (2007) who present a more optimistic view on aid. An Ethiopian 
case study by Farah, Önder and Ayhan (2018) showed that aid has a negative impact 
on democracy and corruption levels, in support of Moyo’s (2009) argument. However, 
Newby (2010) believes that aid is also needed to build strong institutions. Armah (2010) 
argued that aid promotes growth in low corruption and politically stable environments. 
Armah and Amoah (2010) argued that media freedom was important in reducing 
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corruption and guaranteeing the political stability needed to make aid work. However, 
both Armah (2010) and Armah and Amoah (2010) did not focus on aid as a determinant 
of democracy. As different aid volumes and democracy levels experienced in Ghana 
may yield different results, the current research problem was therefore worth studying. 
The findings of this study would provide a clearer understanding of the aid 
governance relationship in Ghana. This adds more knowledge to the existing 
contributions in the aid-governance nexus. With scholars calling for more aid, it is very 
important to investigate single cases to understand the situation for individual countries. 
It will then feed into further research into the aid mechanisms that facilitate a positive 
impact on governance. This is in the hopes of carrying lessons and modifying aid 
mechanisms in other countries which show that aid weakens governance quality to 
improve the situation. 
This research is also relevant in marking the way forward in the Ghana Beyond 
aid agenda. Scholars such as Armah and Adei (2018) have written on the need for 
quality governance to achieve the Ghana Beyond Aid agenda. However, aid has a 
potential to improve governance quality (Moss et al, 2006; Brautigam et al, 2004). With 
the findings of this research, policy makers can then look into mechanisms to ensure 
good quality governance in the absence of aid.  
 
1.7 Organization of the Paper 
 The rest of this study is divided into 4 chapters. The second chapter examines 
related literature. A review of scholarly works will present gaps that will be addressed 
by this thesis. The third chapter presents the methodology that was employed in the 
study, including the data that were used and their sources.  The results section of the 
paper, the fourth chapter, will present the findings from applying the methodology. 
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These findings are discussed in conjunction with the hypothesis and relevant literature. 
Lastly, the fifth chapter will conclude the study and give recommendations based on 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Overview 
This chapter reviews the existing body of knowledge and current discussions on 
Official Development Aid and its effectiveness on the continent. Discussions of the 
literature will first explore the question of whether or not aid works, and then delve into 
the correlational relationship between aid and governance. Finally, the empirical 
evidence reviewed throughout the chapter would be used to establish the theoretical 
frameworks that underpin and set the foundation of the current study. 
 
2.2 Exploring Aid; Does Aid Work? 
Perhaps, the most intriguing aspect and, perhaps, oldest question in the aid 
debate is whether or not aid works. Extensive literature on the effectiveness of aid is 
still inconclusive on this matter. However, according to Pedrosa-Garcia (2017), four 
features of the conversation surrounding the effectiveness of aid can be highlighted. At 
the core of these features is whether aid contributes to development or not.  
The first feature is the argument that aid leads to growth (Hansen and Tarp, 
2001). Dalgaard, Hansen & Tarp (2004), in their empirical analysis of the effectiveness 
of aid, showed that many countries have improved productivity, which can be attributed 
to aid. They relate this to increased growth and development, as well as poverty 
alleviation. Morrissey (2001) establishes mechanisms through which aid can improve 
economic growth. He concludes that aid increases investment (both human and physical 
capital), improves import capacity for capital goods and also has no inverse impact on 
investment and savings rate. Bauer (1981) also supports ODA by advancing the 
following: a) it facilitates economic growth; b) it is instrumental in poverty alleviation; 
c) it is a good medium for income redistribution. 
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Furthermore, White (1993) puts forward the idea that the adverse effect of aid 
on taxes is dependent, among other things, on the impact of aid on private investment. 
This means that the effect of aid on private investment determines if aid has an adverse 
or positive effect on taxes. Using annual data from 1960 to 1997 for a sample of 71 
developing countries, Karras (2006) found from his study on the relationship between 
foreign aid and growth in GDP per capita that foreign aid has a favourable, permanent 
and statistically significant impact on economic growth. Lastly, Gamanee, Girma and 
Morrisey (2005) established in a pooled paneled regression representing 25 Sub-
Saharan African countries for the period 1970-1997, that aid has a positive impact on 
growth through transmission mechanisms such as public investment. They therefore 
conclude that aid ineffectiveness is not the cause of Africa’s growth problems. 
 The second feature is the conditional elements of aid needed to engender 
development. Here, Burnside and Dollar (2000) find that aid’s capacity to positively 
impact growth rests on the presence of good policies in the recipient countries. 
However, Dalgaard et al. (2004) find that the relationship between policy and aid is 
weak, and therefore, not a good justification for why aid will work in one country and 
not the other. Further conditional elements presented in the literature include the 
presence of an appropriate climatic environment (Guillaumount, Chauvet, 2001). 
Dalgaard et al. (2004), in establishing that aid spurs growth, acknowledged that the 
magnitude of this effect is dependent upon “climate-related circumstances” measured 
by fraction of land in tropical areas. Strikingly, they realize that aid does not work in 
the tropics because: (1) climate may directly impact productivity; (2) climatic 
conditions may have affected the development of “slow‐moving structural 
characteristics” such as institutions. However, their examination is far from conclusive 
as to whether climate poses a factor in aid efficiency. Moyo (2009) also mentions that 
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climate affects productivity, stating that though the tropics needs aid, its present 
underdevelopment is due to an innate incapacity to improve.  
In addition, Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor (2004) establish another 
conditional feature that aid has a potential to reduce poverty if well allocated. They 
specify that three factors (inequality, corruption and composition of public expenditure) 
are tied to aid effectiveness using the public expenditure index. This is supplemented 
with inequality and corruption indexes for a sample of 34 countries for a period from 
1980 - 2000. The public expenditure index is generally constructed with sectors 
considered to be pro poor such as education where their poverty elasticities are taken, 
and a composite policy indicator is devised that evaluates sectoral outflows. Also, 
Armah (2010) argues that aid promotes growth in low corruption and politically stable 
environments. In a cross-sectional approach, a dataset of 31 Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
countries from 1984-2007 was analyzed to demonstrate the relevance of political 
stability in achieving a positive aid-growth relationship. This conclusion is 
corroborated by an earlier study by Islam (2005) who also showed the pertinence of 
political stability to the aid-growth relationship. 
 The third feature is that some authors argue that aid is clearly counterproductive 
to growth. Friedman (1995) argues that aid should cease altogether. He mentions that 
economic growth is required to achieve democracy and freedom. He states that the aid 
efficacy concept rests on three basic propositions: first, that the answer to economic 
growth is capital availability; second, that undeveloped countries are too poor to rely 
on themselves for the needed capital; third, that a centralized economic plan and control 
by government is significantly required for economic development. These propositions, 
according to Friedman (1995) are essentially half-truths. He argues that the aid given 
to provide the needed capital leads to inefficiencies, mostly characterized by inefficient 
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production rather than comparative production as capital will be channeled into 
production projects that will not contribute to economic strength. A possible way to 
control this is to control the use of aid inflows into recipient countries, violating 
recipient government sovereignty in policy formation. This then renders foreign aid as 
a tradeoff where the set of inherited ignorant values which limits the potential of a 
people is replaced with an equally limiting set of political and economic controls 
(Friedman, 1995). He then proposes a robust free market which he believes is consistent 
with political freedom and democracy.  
Also, Easterly (2002) is of the opinion that the absence of economic incentives 
in policy formation nullifies aid. Here, he reasons that the gap theory, along with the 
Harrod-Domar model is flawed in the sense that it lacks the incentive needed to make 
aid effective (Chenery & Strout, 1966). The gap theory contends that aid promotes 
growth by expanding the foreign exchange and investment required for growth. The 
incentive needed in here is the one to invest rather than spend. Thinking of the 
incentives which aid recipient face, the rational path to follow is to invest in the future 
when a high return on investment is yielded now and not to invest when high returns 
are not seen. Aid will therefore not push its recipients to increase their investment; the 
obvious incentive is to purchase more consumption goods. Hence, “on balance there is 
no relationship” between aid and growth (Easterly, 2002, p.34). 
 The last feature is that aid efficacy depends on aid objectives. In this case, 
authors consider specific goal setting such as poverty reduction and other non-
economic factors such as education, health or political support. Tilak (1998) supposes 
that educational aid results in growth, poverty reduction, and income redistribution. 
Also, findings show that school feeding programs significantly improve the cognitive 
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performance of unprivileged children in underdeveloped countries (Greenhalgh, 
Kristjansson & Robinson 2007).  
 The reason aid conversations are quite divergent in nature is the numerous 
factors that affect the impact of aid. Therefore, one of the ways aid can be more 
understood is through the conditional feature aid efficacy presents.  Therefore, this 
study considered, in particular, the governmental conditionality feature of aid efficacy. 
 
2.3 How Might Governance Affect Aid Effectiveness? 
Though the central point of this study does not focus on governance as the 
dependent variable in the relationship between aid and development, the empirical 
evidence of increased country selectivity in disbursing aid makes this topic worth 
investigating. It further feeds into the analysis of the efficacy of aid on governance 
which will be discussed shortly.  
The governance dimension is a focal point in the discussion of aid effectiveness. 
This is often used against aid. Using regression techniques on 1971 - 1990 non-military 
aid flow data from 96 countries, Boone (1996) analyzed aid effectiveness across several 
governance styles (laissez faire, egalitarian and elitist) and concluded that aid does not 
increase investment or alleviate poverty across political regimes. His argument that the 
political regime does not affect the effectiveness of aid is also supported by Kosack and 
Tobin (2006) who find that democracy does not directly affect foreign aid efficacy. 
Similar results are presented by Hansen and Tarp (2000) who, using an analytic 
framework (in a form of a survey) for evaluating the empirical work on linear 
regressions of foreign aid beginning in 1961, find that there is no relationship between 
foreign aid and growth, despite the presence or absence of strong policies.  
THE IMPACT OF AID ON GOVERNANCE 20 
On the contrary, Islam (2003) finds that there is some correlation between 
political regimes and aid effectiveness. He finds that in tinpot regimes, aid has had very 
little impact on growth as compared to totalitarian regimes where aid has a significantly 
positive influence on growth. A tinpot regime is a regime which displays poor 
leadership style but is not dominant enough to be termed a totalitarian regime. Though 
his research focuses on authoritarian style regimes, it still puts across similar points of 
the influence of good policies on aid effectiveness to that of Burnside and Dollar 
(2000). This is in the sense that tinpot regimes have a lack of central control that affects 
institutional quality greater than a fully totalitarian regime. Findings by Feeny (2007) 
also posit that the manner that recipient governments utilise aid is a vital determinant 
of aid effectiveness. Moreover, research by Economides, Kalyvitis and Philippopoulos 
(2008) also support the theory that political institutional factors influence aid 
effectiveness, particularly, that corruption hampers the aid efficacy on economic 
development. 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) suggest that good policies are a prerequisite for aid 
effectiveness. They measure good policies by evaluating policy variables such as 
inflation rates, budget surplus and trade openness in correlation to growth. This is 
known as the Burnside and Dollar Index. A good combination of policy variables is 
greatly dependent on the democratic responsiveness of recipient governments. The lack 
of democracy can arguably be linked with institutional structure of donors and 
recipients of aid. Regarding the institutional structure of recipient countries, Easterly 
(2002) argues that aid flows to countries with good policies who use aid in an effective 
manner. On the other hand, countries with failing polices receive little aid and hence 
realize little growth. This consequently brings about country selectivity. However, good 
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governance as a conditional factor in disbursing aid (country selectivity) is not always 
seen: According to Alesina and Weder (2002), corrupt countries receive more aid.  
 Institutional structure on the recipient side indicates that aid alone cannot 
sustain development (Moss, Pettersson Gelander & Van de Walle 2006). A state’s 
capacity to collect tax depends on its political development. If recipient states do not 
have well-functioning institutions, then it cannot gradually substitute aid with other 
sources of revenue, thereby trapping them in aid dependency. However, countries 
receiving large amounts of aid will have fewer incentives to strengthen administrative 
efforts and tax collection (Ghura 1998). This leads to aid dependence, which is well 
defined by Riddell as “that process by which the continued provision of aid appears to 
be making no significant contribution to the achievement of self-sustaining 
development.” (Riddell, 1996, p. 24). When aid flows are unaffected or not informed 
by government efficiency, there is then no incentive to use this aid to improve state 
capacity (Bräutigan et al, 2004).  
 
2.4 How Might Foreign Aid Affect Governance 
The previous section explores how governance affects the effectiveness of aid, 
as well as the quantum of aid given. However, this section expatiates on how aid affects 
governance. This relationship is the focal point of this thesis.  
 Once again, there are varying conclusions about the effect of foreign aid on 
governance. According to Bräutigam et al. (2004), high aid levels can improve 
governance, but they can also decrease governance quality. On the positive side, aid 
sent to countries with clear goal sets can be employed to reinforce policy and planning 
capability, upgrade the quality of the civil service and set up strong central institutions.  
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 Nonetheless, Bräutigam et al. (2004) suggest that high aid levels might hinder 
governance development in 2 major ways. Firstly, high aid levels may create incentives 
that make it more problematic to overcome issues involved in building a more capable 
and effective governance in recipient countries. Also, large amounts of aid may weaken 
institutions rather than build them. The ways that this may occur are through aid 
fragmentation, high transaction costs, poaching, destruction of learning opportunities, 
as well as distortion of the budgetary process. According to Moss et al. (2006), studies 
from Ghana show that a rise in foreign aid results in discrepancies between planned and 
actual spending. Also, Moyo (2009) affirms a total negative effect of aid on governance 
in Africa. She maintains that aid has been of more harm than good in Africa. She states 
that the relationship between foreign aid and corruption goes both ways; foreign aid 
leads to corruption, resulting in underdevelopment and corruption causes impractical 
use of aid which again results in underdevelopment rather than development. She 
establishes that though development is the prime target of foreign aid, the unintended 
effects aid causes include domestic corruption and a continuous dependence on aid and 
international resources. In the natural progression of these occurrences, aid in itself 
hinders African development. This expatiates on the paradox of Moss et al. (2006) that 
drives the motivation of the study. Moss et al. (2006) believe that on the one hand, well-
functioning public institutions are a prerequisite of aid efficacy due to their higher 
absorption capacity. However, in the same light, he posits that “the absorption of large 
aid flows may be counterproductive in committing recipient governments to building 
sound and sustainable institutions” (as cited in Newby, 2010) 
The issue of the impact of aid on public institutions and corruption leads to the 
question of absorption capacities. Absorption capacity is the mechanism where foreign 
aid flows and projects funded by ODA reach a certain point after which development 
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becomes stagnant or even declines. Berg (2000) suggests that aid as little as 5% of GDP 
may affect public institutions negatively. Ghana’s national agenda of a nation beyond 
aid has a target to reduce the grant component of GDP, an average of 21% between 
2016 and 2018, to a value below 5% by the end of 2028. However, other studies have 
shown that aid starts failing at higher levels between 15% to 45% based on country-
specific circumstances (Clemens & Radelet, 2003). 
The question of absorption capacities also leads to a breakdown of 
accountability structures. Large aid flows can reduce the incentives for democratic 
accountability. Accountability is naturally enforced when most revenue sources are 
obtained internally, mostly through taxes. However, when aid flows, which are parallel 
to other non-earned revenue sources such as royalties from mineral extraction, are large, 
accountability is reduced. Here, there is less incentive to be accountable to citizens. 
This is because citizens are not contributing to the state’s revenue and therefore there 
is no need to be accountable to them. Thus, accountability largely depends on citizens’ 
contribution to revenue (Newby, 2010). Aid dependency builds accountability as one 
between aid donors and the executive arm of government rather than one between state 
and citizens; this weakens a relevant aspect of governance. (Bräutigam et al, 2004).  
The element of accountability also speaks to Easterly’s point of incentives 
discussed earlier. The lack of incentives can lead to the collective actions problem. This 
is when aid is used on projects recipient countries have not included in developmental 
plans. Weak economies need to concentrate their resources on a limited number of 
essential activities. However, political elites usually have little incentive to fix the 
situation as the aid flows provide remarkable resources for fringe benefits (salary 
increments, vehicles, study tours, etc.) and patronage which would not have been 
available (Brautigam et al, 2004).As a result of the incentives needed for aid to work, 
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aid should be disbursed as a rewarding element to high performing nations. This is 
because most of the issues underlying underdevelopment in Africa are attributed to bad 
governance and resource mismanagement rather than the lack resources (Hansen et al, 
2000) 
 
2.5 An Enquiry into the Measurement of Governance 
Governance has become the focal point of international economy in economic 
debates because it indicates the development of the socio-political environment 
(Jaouadi & Hermass, 2012). Governance, according to the UNDP, is a nexus that relies 
on the interaction between a number of concepts and economic policies by which the 
public participates in project planning. Good governance is then indicated by 
transparency, effective rule of law, and participation (as cited in Jaouadi et al., 2012). 
Knack (1999) also perceives good governance in the form of institutions that 
demonstrate predictable, unbiased, and consistently enforced frameworks and rules for 
investors. The World Bank bases its definition on “the management of public resources, 
accounting, legal framework, free information and transparency” (as cited in Jaouadi et 
al., 2012, p. 186). However, Smout bases the notion of governance on concepts of good 
governance: “Good governance implies a rule of law, good administration, 
transparency and accountability of political leaders to their people” (as cited in Jaouadi 
et al, 2012)  
As the literature has shown so far, aid is likely to have an effect on governance, 
which reflects socio-political conditions in a country. This thesis, therefore, through 
empirical evidence similar to other studies to be discussed below, deduced the 
relationship between aid and governance. However, unlike other studies, this study is a 
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case study on Ghana as compared to the many cross-sectional and panel data analysis 
conducted by other scholars. 
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) is a subjective index that 
measures the quality of governance. ICGR has been employed previously by Knack 
and Keefer (1995), Rodrik (1999) and others in demonstrating cross-country 
differences in economic performance. However, in the domain of aid and governance 
quality, Knack (1999) examined the relationship between aid and governance quality 
using ICGR measure of governance. He found a significant negative relationship 
between aid and the quality of governance in recipient countries over the period 1982 
– 1995. Bräutigam et al. (2004) also make use of ICRG data to examine the relationship 
between aid and governance, restricting the study to Sub-Saharan Africa. The ICGR 
data used are supplemented with an objective measure, central government tax 
collections as a share of GDP. The study also concluded on similar results as Knack 
(1999), stating that there is a strong negative relationship between aid levels and 
governance quality. 
However, Goldsmith (2001) found that aid is positively associated with 
governance, using cross sectional time series regression analysis on the Freedom House 
Index of political freedom. Also, using the Freedom House data for specific country 
case studies, Farah, Önder and Ayhan (2018) find that, again, foreign aid can be 
associated with higher levels of governance and democracy. This thesis also examines 
the relationship between aid and governance with a specific case study on Ghana using 
the Freedom House Index. The Freedom House Index is used based on the limited funds 
available and the ICRG data must be purchased. However, the Freedom house Index 
which rates a country as free, partly free or not free, is a good governance metric on 
which the aid-governance relationship can be built. 
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2.60 Theoretical Framework 
The efficacy of aid started with the modernity theory, where the advancement 
of aid favored a linear path towards growth to mirror the West. This ideology of 
thinking gave rise to the application of growth theories such as the neoclassical models 
and the Harrod-Domar model to study aid and economic growth. Here, it was assumed 
that investment is the key to growth. Deeply related to this was the use of the Solow 
model in the aid field, which in addition to the concept of capital accumulation through 
investment, expected that aid will assist countries to escape the poverty trap, and once 
started on a virtuous cycle, growth would remain and there will be no need for aid 
(Pedrosa-Garcia, 2017). However, it was seen that aid was not resulting in growth and 
that policies and other lurking issues such as governance were important (Krueger, 
Michalopoulos & Ruttan, 1989). 
 
2.61 Principal Agent Theory 
 To build the argument of the thesis, the framework for thinking about the 
determinants of aid effectiveness proposed by Howes (2014) is needed. Howes (2014) 
states that there are three schools of thought on aid effectiveness: the recipient, donor, 
and transaction costs schools. Of particular importance to this thesis is the recipient 
school of thought. The framework is built on the principal-agent theory which is well 
suited for the analysis of the aid relationship. The theory establishes that donors, as 
principals, cannot fully control recipient countries. To further establish basis for the 
analysis, three concepts must be understood, two of which are important to this study; 
first is the performance of the recipient; second is the performance of the donor. 
Performance is measured by governance. Here, the better the performance of both the 
recipient and donor country, the greater the effectiveness of aid.  
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 Under the recipient school, it is claimed that aid efficacy is dependent of sound 
policies in recipient countries (Burnside & Dollar 2004). It ties in with the view that 
domestic institutions primarily determine economic performance (Rodrik 2003).  Good 
governance is also important because it has been found that aid is fungible, where more 
aid funding to a particular sector leads to a decrease in government expenditure to that 
same sector. Here, aid frees up funds for other purposes not preconceived by donors 
and usually does not benefit citizens (Swaroop & Devarajan 1998). Howes (2014) 
believes that if the holistic impact of aid considers domains outside the sector directly 
receiving the aid, then donors must be concerned with governance overall and not 
individual aid-funded causes.  
 If aid effectiveness is determined by governance, then donors as principals 
should utilize aid to improve the performance levels of their agents (Howes, 2014). 
According to Howes (2014), there are two ways to do this: country selectivity or 
attempting to improve the performance of all its recipient governments through using 
aid to promote good governance and aid conditionality. Collier, an important author in 
the recipient school writes that ‘aid should be assessed by its ability to promote reform’ 
(Collier 2002, p. 2). As the literature shows, aid is likely to have a negative effect on 
governance without good institutions (Abuzeid, 2009).  
 
2.62 Threshold Theory 
This theory posits that aid contributes to socio-political development in 
recipient countries up to a certain level after which the aid flows begin to have a 
negative impact on governance. This theory is explored by Jaouadi and Hermassi 
(2012) using empirical work done by Knack in 1999 on the relationship between aid 
THE IMPACT OF AID ON GOVERNANCE 28 
flows and governance quality. The test by Jaouadi and Hermassi (2012) find the 
following in support of the theory: 
• Recipient countries with a higher ICRG compared to other countries at the 
beginning of the period showed a boost in their governance 
• An increase in GDP per capita assists in improving quality of governance in 
recipient countries (whether or not there is a threshold) 
• Therefore, a change in GDP per capita is an indication of wealth, assisting to 
increase the quality of governance as it shows that the country’s financial ability 
to offset the adjustment costs is linked with institutional reforms. 
However, without the existence of the threshold, similar results to that of Knack (1999) 
were obtained, where, in the short run, aid has a negative effect on governance. Here, 
the initial advantage of a higher ICRG does not contribute to governance improvement.  
This shows that the countries with high governance scores must work extra hard to 
maintain the improvement which can be compromised by aid. Therefore, aid can 
present a harmful effect on governance as aid commitments superficially tend to 
increase corruption opportunities in recipient countries. However, from the study, the 
threshold at which aid will be beneficial to governance is unknown. 
 
2.63 Big Push Theory 
The big push theory in the aid sphere is the belief that most of the problems in 
developing countries will be solved by the influx of aid into those areas. Proponents of 
aid such as Sachs (2005) have stuck to the need for more aid to meet the needs of the 
third world; he argues that the world could have met its MDGs in 2015 if there was 
more aid given. However, Easterly (2006) has greatly disputed the big push theory, 
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stating that with this massive influx of aid, there are deaths caused by illnesses that have 
one cent vaccines. However, he advocates for better aid. 
Evidence of economic growth also goes contrary to the big push theory. In the 
last 50 years, aid inflows to Sub-Saharan Africa came up to USD1 trillion; however, 
GDP per capita has declined over the same period (Abuzeid, 2009). According to 
Abuzeid (2009), World Bank estimations show that aid transfers to Zambia should 
place its GDP per capita at over USD20,000 now. However, it has remained at USD 
600 for years. 
In another light, the big push theory has been disputed to erode the quality of 
governance. Opponents of the theory such as Moyo (2009) argue that aid perpetuates 
corruption and rather does more harm than good. Brautigan (2000) also, through 
empirical evidence, suggests that an influx of aid erodes governance. According to 
Abuzeid (2009), the influx of aid has also distorted power balance in recipient 
countries, resulting in politicization of economic life and an increase in rent-seeking 
activities.  
Though the big push theory has been widely disputed, it is important, with the 
threshold theory, to know to what extent foreign aid is beneficial to governance. In 
other words, to what extent should a push be made for the influx of foreign aid that will 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Overview 
This research aimed to investigate the relationship between aid and the quality 
of governance in Ghana. A similar study is conducted by Farah, Önder, and Ayhan 
(2018) to evaluate the impact of aid to the socio-economic advancement of Ethiopia 
using time series data and regression analysis. However, this study sought to explore 
the socio-political impact of aid in Ghana using similar time series data and regression 
analysis. In light of this, this chapter expands on the research design, research variables, 
and data analysis procedures. 
 
3.2 Research Design 
The research question required a quantitative research approach. This method 
makes use of figures, mathematical formulas, statistical computations and inferences in 
response to the research question; it does this by evaluating relationships or making 
predictions by analyzing data quantitatively (Leedy, 1993).  This approach is best for 
this study because it lends itself to hypothesis testing and analyses of data statistically 
to establish relationships (Jupp, 2011). In this case, the form of the data for the variables 
under analysis, which is both aid and governance quality, is quantitative, and to 
establish the relationship between them, quantitative methods, specifically regression 
had to be used. 
 
3.3 Research Scope and Data Sources 
Since this is a country-specific case study, the study was limited to only Ghana. 
This research utilized times series data on the various variables under observation, 
ranging from 1984 – 2018, a period of 34 years. Data measuring foreign aid dependency 
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were obtained from the World Development Indicators. On the other hand, data in 
relation to the quality of governance, that is, International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
data were obtained from the Quality of Governance Institute and Political Risk Services 
(PRS) Group. Variables, GDP per capita and population and trade openness, intended 
to be moderating factors were obtained from the World Development Indicators.  
 
3.4 Data Description 
The specific variables, foreign aid and governance quality, act as the 
explanatory and response variables for this study. Other explanatory variables include 
GDP per capita, trade openness and population. 
Most studies on the impact of aid utilize aid as a percentage of gross domestic 
product (GDP) (Boone, 1996). However, according to Brautigan et al. (2004), aid as a 
percentage of government expenditure also serves as a plausible measure of the 
dependency of aid.  Brautigan et al. (2004) makes use of both variables in their analysis. 
However, data on aid as a percentage of central government expense for Ghana 
available from the World Bank Development Indicators are from 2001 to 2015 with 
data gaps in 2012 and 2013. Therefore, this dataset cannot be used due to the data gaps 
present.  
Governance is measured using the International Country Risk Guide (ICGR) 
Indicator of Quality of Government index obtained from the Quality of Governance 
(QOG) Institute database, an independent research organization at the University of 
Gothenburg. The ICRG collects and converts financial, political information and 
economic data into risk points. The ICRG Indicator of Quality of Government is the 
mean value of ICRG variables “Corruption”, “Law and Order” and “Bureaucracy 
Quality” on a scale of 0-1 according to the QOG Institute codebook. Higher quality of 
government is indicated by higher mean values. Due to the inclusion of corruption in 
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the mean value of the indicator, I did not include the Transparency International 
Corruption index in the model as done in Farah et al. (2018). Papers such as Knack 
(1999) and Brautigan et al. (2004) have made use of ICGR Indicator of Quality of 
Government to measure governance. However, data to be obtained from ICGR starts 
from 1984, fewer points than the Freedom House Index which has been used by Farah 
et al (2018), and Goldsmith (2001) in measuring governance and democracy. Both the 
Freedom House Index and the International Country Risk Guide (ICGR) are subjective 
indexes and are unique among various quality of governance measures used in 
empirical studies on growth as they include a greater number of African countries for a 
comparatively longer period of time. However, the Freedom of House index for the 
period under consideration has gap years of no data for Ghana. 
In suggestions made in Brautigam et al (2004), changes in population and GDP 
per capita are added explanatory variables. Here, change in population controls for 
economies of scale (a product of population growth) that may lead to building effective 
institutions and consequently, an increase in the ICRG index. Also, an increase in per 
capita income feeds into a larger number and size of transactions which then increase 
the quality of developing institutions, enforcement and adjudication mechanisms. 
ICRG ratings may even be influenced by income changes (Brautigam et al, 2004). In 
times that corruption and bureaucratic information is unavailable or hard to come by, 
ICRG may deduce governance quality from economic performance. Therefore, in 
periods where there is high economic growth coupled with a rise in institutional quality 
and low aid levels – or periods of low economic performance coupled with deteriorating 
governance quality and high aid levels, failing to control for income changes could lead 
to a ‘spurious negative relation between aid dependence and the quality’ (Brautigam et 
al, 2004, p. 269). In other areas, the trade openness may be associated with good 
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governance and vice versa; therefore, trade openness, calculated as exports plus imports 
as percent of GDP is also accounted for. 
 
3.4 Hypothesis 
This study sought to investigate if foreign aid influences governance. Thus, the 
hypothesis for the study are as follows: 
Null hypothesis, H0: There is no relationship between foreign aid and governance in 
Ghana 
Alternate hypothesis, Ha: There is a relationship between foreign aid and governance 
in Ghana 
 
3.6 Empirical Approach 
To determine the relationship between the variables of interest, the OLS 
regression model was employed. OLS regression is a statistical technique employed to 
evaluate the intensity and direction of the relationship between an explanatory and 
response variable that has been collected over a period of time. This model therefore 
allows for grasping the magnitude of the effect of aid on governance, highlighting the 
threshold theory and was therefore employed in estimating the variables (Farah et al, 
2018). It was chosen for two reasons: it was widely accepted as a statistical technique 
for evaluating and forecasting relationships between variables, and, secondly, its results 
are easy to explain. The results from this analytical technique are discussed in the 
subsequent chapter.  
The OLS regression evaluates variables in the following general format 
              𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 , 𝑡 = 1, 2, … 𝑛.                (1) 
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where 𝑦 and 𝑥 represent the dependent and explanatory variable respectively. 𝛼1 and 
𝛽1 represent the intercept and coefficient of the explanatory variable and 𝑢 captures all 
unobserved variables that have an effect on the dependent variable.  
From this, a multivariate model is used to factor in four explanatory variables. 
Similar multivariate regression have been employed in Knack (1999), Brautigan et al. 
(2004) and Jaouadi et al. (2012) to study the impact of aid on quality of governance. 
The OLS regression model will therefore be modified as follows: 
𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽2∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶_1984𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝑃𝑂𝑃/𝑃𝑂𝑃_1984 𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                                                            (2) 
where ICRG represents the ICRG Quality of Governance index, a measurement of 
governance, for each time period, t. AID denotes the annual aid flows over the period, 
t, measured as aid as a percentage of GNI. ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶_1984 denotes GDP per 
capita changes over the sample time period with the first year of the sample data, 1984, 
being the base year. Similarly, ∆POP/POP_1984 represents the change in population 
over the sample time period with the first year of the sample data, 1984 in respect to 
time, t, respectively. TRADE denotes trade openness which is measured as net exports 
as a percent of GDP. The time period from 1984 to 2018 is denoted by t. 𝛼1denotes the 
intercept, and 
𝛽1,  𝛽2,  𝛽3, and 𝛽4, are the relevant parameters. 
All explanatory variables are log transformed to provide a convenient way to 
interpret the coefficients, that is, in percentages. Also, the log transformation would 
compress the data, and make the variable approach normality, an assumption in OLS 
regressions. Also, since the literature review spoke to a bi-directional relationship 
between aid and governance, a regression was carried out with aid on the left-hand side 
and quality of governance on the right-hand side. This was to illustrate if governance 
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affects the volume of aid. It also enabled the notion that aid flows to countries with 
better governance to be tested by noticing if a high index of governance quality is 
associated with larger aid flows. 
Since the variables are represented using time series data, there is a need to 
ensure that the data and OLS regression satisfy the following time-series assumptions, 
This is to avoid spurious results in the OLS model and ensuring that the model provides 
the Best Linear Unbiased Estimators (BLUE) (Wooldridge, 2013). 
To ensure that the linearity and weak dependence assumption is met, the 
stationarity properties of the model were investigated using the augmented Dickey 
Fuller test (ADF) (Dickey & Fuller 1979). Common critiques of the ADF test include 
sensitivity to inappropriate lag estimations and low power properties. Given these 
weaknesses, the Phillips-Perron (PP) test, which gives room for a deterministic time 
trend and a non-zero mean, was also conducted (Phillip & Perron, 1988). If the data is 
found to be non-stationary at level I(0), that is there is a presence of unit roots, the data 
is differenced. With no serious issues with stationarity, the OLS regression is estimated 
Another assumption is the condition of zero conditional mean where all 
independent variables have an expected error term value for each time period of zero. 
Another assumption is that no explanatory variable should be constant, nor have a 
perfect linear combination with other explanatory variables to ensure there is no perfect 
collinearity; to establish this, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) method was estimated 
(Wooldridge, 2013). To add on, there should be no serial correlation, meaning that 
errors in two distinct time periods should have no correlation. Lastly is the assumption 
that the error term of the OLS regression has a constant variance over time. The 
assumption of no serial correlation and homoscedasticity in errors was ensured by using 
the Newey & West (1987, 1994) Homoskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent 
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(HAC) covariance matric estimators to test the coefficients of the regression (as cited 
in Zeileis, 2004). 
These asymptotic time series assumptions apply to large sampled data, thereby, 
the normality assumption is well satisfied under the central limit theory (Wooldridge, 
2013). However, since the time period under observation presented a small sample size, 
normality was corrected using log transformations.  
 
3.7 Data Analysis 
The OLS regression coefficient was employed to establish whether foreign aid 
negatively or positively affects governance quality. Also, the coefficient of the 
governance variable was to determine the magnitude at which foreign aid affects 
governance in Ghana. The p-value was used to determine if the relationships found 
between aid and governance were statistically significant or not. A significant level of 
5% is the benchmark that was used to evaluate the p-value. 
The statistical software for the study were Excel and R Studio. Data collection 
was done in Excel and R studio used for filtering and data analysis, that is, for graphing, 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
4.1 Overview 
This chapter presents the results of the statistical analysis of data obtained from 
the World Bank Databank Indicators, the International Country Risk Indicators, the 
PRS Group and The Quality of Governance Institute. This chapter starts with summary 
statistics of the variables under analysis, followed by an overview of the preparation of 
the data for analyses, which includes the test assumptions for times series data. 
Following this is the execution of the multiple OLS regression and the discussion of 
the regression results. The methods, and analysis of the data are discussed in the context 
of the theoretical framework and methodology outlined. 
 
4.2 Summary Statistics 
 The results of the summary statistics in Table 1 show that on average ICRG 
index is 0.45, with ICRG index ranging from 0.14 to 0.62 over the period from 1983 – 
2017. Aid as a percentage of GNI had a mean percentage of 7.86% for the period under 
observation, with a standard deviation of 3.98%. Observed values of aid intensity as 
measured by aid as a percentage of GNI were within the bounds of 1.66% and 16.34%.  
 The average change in GDP per capita relative to 1984 over the period was 
0.04%, with a similar standard deviation. The highest change in GDP per capita was 
0.2%, with the minimum being a decline in GDP per capita by 0.003%. Change in 
population relative to 1984 had an annual average of 0.04% with a standard deviation 
of 0.01%. The highest annual population growth was 0.05% and the lowest was a 0.03% 
growth rate.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics for basic sample of time series data used in multiple 
regression 
Variable Count Mean SD Min Max 
ICRG value 35 0.45 0.11 0.14 0.62 
Aid as a percentage of GNI 35 7.86 3.98 1.66 16.34 
GDP per capita change/1984 
GDP per capita 
35 0.04 0.04 -0.003 0.20 
Population change/1984 
population 
35 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.05 
Trade openness 35 68.45 23.53 18.81 116.05 
Note: SD = Standard Deviation. Source: Author’s own calculation based on data from 
the World Bank’s Databank Indicators, International Country Risk Indicators, The PRS 
Group and The Quality of Governance Institute  
 
 
4.3 Test Assumptions for Time Series OLS Regression 
This section elaborates on the data preparation process of testing the data to be 
analyzed to ensure that it meets the time series regression assumptions mentioned in 
the methodology. This section covers both pre- and post-estimation tests. 
 
4.3.1 Test for Zero Conditional Mean 
To ensure the presence of a zero-conditional mean, the average of the errors for 
the dependent variable given values of the independent variable was computed. The 
average of the residuals was zero, satisfying the assumption of a zero-conditional mean. 
 
4.3.2 Test for Multicollinearity 
This test is to confirm the absence of a perfect correlation between the 
independent variables. This implies that a presence of some level of correlation between 
the explanatory variables is not an issue, but a very high or perfect correlation of one 
would lead to biased regression estimations. To test multicollinearity, I employed the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) method. The results from the test are below in Table 2.  
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Table 2: VIF results for collinearity test 
Variables VIF 
Aid as a percentage of GNI 1.682 
Change in income per capita 1.815 
Population growth 2.53 
Trade openness 1.40 
Source: Author’s calculations using R 
With the use of this method, a VIF that exceeds 10 indicates the presence of 
multicollinearity. With values computed at most 50% below the rule of thumb, the 
assumption of no multicollinearity has been met. 
 
4.3.3 Stationarity Test 
 Another assumption for time series regressions is the presence of stationarity in 
the variables. The absence of stationarity variables can lead to spurious regressions. 
Here, the variables must display a constant mean over different time periods. To test 
the stationarity of the data under observation, I applied both the Phillips-Perron and 
Augmented Dickey Fuller test for stationarity. Both tests are run in order to firmly 
conclude on the order of integration for the variables under observation.  
 The ADF test is an extension of the Dickey Fuller test. It tests the null and 
alternate hypotheses of: 
𝐻0: Series contains unit roots 
𝐻𝑎: Series is stationary 
Using, the “urca” package in R, a further implementation of both the Augmented 
Dickey Fuller test and the PP test is carried out over the standard adf.test and pp.test 
functions in the “tseries” package. I conducted the ADF test under two conditions: (1) 
when there is a constant only and; (2) when there is a constant and trend.  
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To further establish the results of the Augmented Dickey Fuller test, the 
Phillips-Perron test for stationarity, which is also an extension of the Dickey Fuller test, 
was carried out. Using the same null and alternate hypotheses as that of the Augmented 
Dickey Fuller test, it tested the stationarity of the time series variables under two 
conditions: (1) when there is presence of a constant and trend and; (2)when there is no 
constant and trend in the series.  
The results of the following tests presented in Table 3 establish that all the 
variables are stationary at level except aid as a percentage of GNI, which is stationary 
at first difference. Since there are no serious issues with stationarity, there is no need to 
check for cointegration. The regression is estimated using variables at level and first 
order integration. 
 
Table 3: Augmented Dickey Fuller and Phillip-Perron Stationarity Test Results 
 ADF Test PP Test Order of  
integration 





ICRG value -2.67* -2.48 -4.40*** -3.80** I(0) 
















-2.62* -3.57** -2.80** -3.66** I(0) 
Population 
growth 
-1.33 -6.34*** -0.80 -1.79 I(0) 
Trade 
openness 
-3.11** -2.54 -3.68*** -2.67 I(0) 
Significance level: *** .01, **.05, *.1. First order integration stationarity test results 
shown in parenthesis 
Source: Author’s calculations using R.  
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4.3.4 Test for Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation 
 The Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) estimator is 
employed in conducting the coefficient test for robust standard errors to ensure that the 
errors of all coefficient estimates are both homoscedastic and not serially correlated 
(Zeileis, 2004). Here, there should be a constant variance in the error term and 
uncorrelated errors between 2 time periods  
 
4.4 Presentation of Regression Results 
 Since the results of the stationarity test show no serious unit root issues, the 
OLS regression is estimated without the need for a cointegration test and an error 
correction model. The results of the OLS regression estimates are presented in Table 4 
 
Table 4:  Regression estimates for ICRG Quality-of-Governance Index for Ghana 
 Dependent variable: 
  
 ICRG Governance Index (in logs) 
Constant 
Aid as a percentage of GDP (in logs) 
(lag = 1) 
Change in GDP per capita (in logs) 
Population growth (in logs) 




Adjusted 𝑅2  













3.867*** (df = 4; 28) 
 
 
Note. HAC robust standard errors reported in parenthesis; Significance level: *** .01, 
**.05, *.1 
Source: Author’s estimations using R.  
  
The regression shows that there is a small positive effect of foreign aid on the 
level of governance. The coefficients show that a percentage increase in the aid/GNI 
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ratio will lead to an increase in the ICRG Quality of Governance Index by 0.166%. 
Other significant coefficients are that of change in population relative to 1984 and 
change in GDP per capita relative to 1984. Surprisingly, change in GDP per capita 
relative to 1984 has a significant negative effect on the ICRG index. The 𝑅2 and 
adjusted 𝑅2 of 47% and 39% show the variability in the ICRG index that is accounted 
for by explanatory variables. This shows that the A significant f-value of 3.867 at 1% 
shows that the variables are jointly zero. 
It appears that contrary to the perversity theory, aid has a small beneficial 
influence on quality governance. It is therefore difficult to maintain that moral hazard 
associated with aid undermines governance quality in Ghana. The principal-agent 
theory has not caused a negative effect on governance. In actual fact, both donors and 
recipient countries indicate they have been trying to achieve higher governance quality, 
and not a contrary outcome. Both Goldsmith (2001) and Farah et al (2018) using the 
Freedom House Index conclude on a similar association that higher levels of aid is 
positively linked with governance. Farah et al (2018), a country specific study showed 
this relationship for Ethiopia, a country known for its high aid dependency. This 
similarity of country specific studies, Farah et al (2018) and this thesis, show the need 
for country specific instances to offer new accounts on aid dependence. 
Although this research design does not show empirically why there is a positive 
impact of aid on governance, the principal agent theory attributes a positive impact of 
aid on governance to the good performance of both the recipient and donor countries. 
Outcomes of these performance may include solving the collective action problem and 
introducing hard budget constraints that reduce aid fungibility. Hard budget constraints 
include restrictions on the size of a budget deficit and the option to carry budget deficit 
into the next year. These restrictions create good policy practices in recipient countries 
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and leads to the effective use of aid funds. A classic example of hard budget constraints 
used over the period under observation is during the SAPs. The hard budget constraints, 
together with other conditionalities, that accompanied the disbursement of aid over the 
period led to high fiscal discipline on the part of government. 
 The results also suggest that there may be too much emphasis on the negative 
effects of aid on governance. The big push theory does not inevitably erode the quality 
of governance. This is not to discredit opponents of the big push theory who have 
provided anecdotal and empirical evidence of the negative effects of aid on governance 
(Moyo, 2009; Brautigam et al, 2004). It is however important to look at aid delivery 
and the big push theory in context with the threshold theory to know to what extent 
foreign aid is beneficial to governance. 
 The worrisome aspect of this regression is the existence of reverse causality. If 
aid seems to increase governance, in Ghana, then it likely that donors deliver aid based 
on the notion of the country’s governance indicators. Indeed, many aid scholars 
maintain that aid should be targeted on states with good democracies and governance. 
Studies have shown that aid targeted on states with good institutions leads to aid 
efficacy (Armah, 2010). Also, the paradox mentioned by Moss et al (2006) where the 
aid requirement to build well-functioning institutions counters the requirement for good 
institutions for aid effectiveness also points to aid delivery based on governance. 
However, the essential point from this regression is that it shows for period under 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this concluding chapter of the report, I present a recap of the highlights of 
this thesis including the research issue and significance, the research question asked, 
the empirical method as well as the findings. I move on to provide conclusions, 
recommendations and suggest viable areas for future study. 
 
5.1 Summary 
This thesis explores the impact of aid dependence on governance in Ghana. 
Even with few countries being well governed or showing signs of aid efficacy, there is 
still an influx of aid to solve Africa’s problems. On the other hand, the crucial role of 
governance quality in establishing development is rather apparent. With the continuous 
flow of aid in the face of deteriorating governance, there is the apparent question: “Does 
aid dependency deteriorate governance?” This study therefore sought to establish the 
aid-governance relationship for Ghana by asking the question, “Does aid increase 
governance quality in Ghana?”  
 Secondary data were collected from the World Bank’s Databank Indicators, 
International Country Risk Indicators, The PRS Group and The Quality of Governance 
Institute for a 1982 to 2018 time period. Based on theoretical frameworks, the OLS 
regression model was employed to explore the relationship between aid and 
governance. However, since time series data were being used, there was a need to 
ensure that tall time series assumptions were met to avoid spurious results. With all the 
assumptions satisfied, the regression model was estimated. 
 The results of this estimation showed that aid has a positive impact on 
governance. Though this was contrary to the mainstream thesis that aid has a negative 
effect on governance, it shows that aid can have a positive effect on governance in 
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country-specific studies. However, due to the paradox that Moss et al (2006) presents, 
the issue of causality is not strictly established in this study.  
 
5.2 Conclusion 
 Foreign aid supplements government efforts to run basic functions such as 
paying salaries and purchasing goods and services. However, aid dependence does not 
indicate that Ghana has lost some state capacity, nor does it show that governance 
outlook will be more favorable without or with less aid. Based on the OLS results, it 
can be seen that there is a slight positive relationship between aid and governance. 
Looking at this, I believe that aid has boosted Ghana’s governance quality more than it 
has deteriorated it.  
 
5.3 Recommendations 
The results suggest that aid actually has a positive impact on governance in 
Ghana may have implications on socio-political development. The Ghana Beyond Aid 
agenda will mean that there will be absence of aid, calling into question the outlook of 
state capacity with time as it can be seen that aid contributes to governance. Scholars 
such as Armah and Adei (2018) have spoken on the need for quality governance to 
achieve the Ghana Beyond Aid agenda. However, since aid can be seen to contribute 
to governance, policy makers need to investigate new mechanisms that will ensure good 
quality governance in the absence of aid.  
 The results will also mean that governance issues that are typically associated 
with aid such as fungibility, rent seeking, unaccountability may not be associated with 
deteriorating governance. Therefore, other causes of deteriorating governance should 
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be considered in the diagnosis of poor governance facets such as corruption and 
bureaucracy.  
Lastly, the case of Ghana showing a positive impact of aid on governance 
should be used as a foundation to investigate and carry on lessons from the case of 
Ghana to modify aid mechanisms in other countries which show that aid weakens 
governance quality. These lessons should be applied tactfully and with discretion, 
taking into account unique socio-cultural and eco-political factors present in other 
countries 
 
5.3.1 Future Study Areas 
 The aid-governance literature is a field with many research prospects. Country-
specific studies are particularly important to facilitate unique diagnosis of the aid-
governance relationship to inform policy on both the donor and recipient sides. 
Moreover, other good quality governance measures such as the Country Policy 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) from the World Bank and the Mo Ibrahim’s index of 
governance by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation can be substituted for the ICRG index in 
the distant future, as the current data do not present samples large enough for BLUE 
country-specific result estimates. Lastly, other estimation methods such as the two stage 
least squared methods, as well as other econometrical approaches may be used to 
investigate this country as well as other country cases in the aid-governance field. 
  
5.4 Limitation 
Since this study is meant to be country specific, the results from this research 
cannot provide a generalization to other countries. Also, since the ICRG data on quality 
of governance for Ghana begins in 1984, it made the period under consideration only 
34 years. This is a relatively small sample for OLS regressions using time series data.  
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Lastly, the empirical approached used does not explore the existence of reverse 
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